"The British battle fleet is like the queen on the chess board; it may remain at base but it still dominates the game. It is the final arbiter at sea; to lose it is to lose the game."
The above quote could stand as a summary of the central strategic issue behind the Battle of Jutland on May 31 to June 1, 1916. Jutland was indeed a climactic confrontation between the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet, a veritable clash of Titans. But unlike the outcome of our alternate history version, it effectively broke the power of the German surface fleet for the remainder of the World War I.
Ever since Trafalgar, conceivably since Drake's victory over the Spanish Armada, England controlled the seas as the preeminent naval power. The tradition of British sea dominance anchored the expansion of her vast overseas Empire and gave Britain unparalleled influence over international trade. Years before 1914, the German government had concluded the only way to become a true colonial power would be to build a great navy to rival Britain's. Britain viewed German ambition with distrust, and so began a great naval arms race.
The ships of each navy reflected the design philosophies of their nation. The British emphasized higher speed and greater armament at the expense of armor while the Germans prioritized armor at the expense of speed and armament.
By the time World War I began, the German High Seas Fleet had become a formidable navy, but Britain's Grand Fleet outnumbered it two to one in terms of the number of ships. Though German technology generally exceeded that of the British, the sheer numerical superiority enjoyed by the Royal Navy gave Britain an overwhelming advantage in any prolonged naval conflict. Finally, ships sailing from German ports required passage through either the English Channel or the North Sea to reach the Atlantic. Britain's location permitted the Grand Fleet to bottle up the German Navy.
The Germans assumed before World War I that Britain would adopt a "close blockade" of their North Sea ports, as the Royal Navy had done against the French, Spanish, and Portuguese over previous centuries. To counter this strategy, Germany produced powerful, heavily armored ships and large numbers of fast torpedo boats. However the British Admiralty was astute enough to realize the nature of sea warfare had changed and that a close blockade would no longer be effective.
In the days of sail, ships could remain at sea as long as food and water permitted, but the development of steam power dramatically changed this dynamic. Instead, ironclad steamships were required to return to port regularly to replenish the coal necessary to fire their boilers.
Consequently, for the British to maintain a close blockade, they needed a fleet perhaps three times larger than that of Germany, in order to permit enough ships to maintain the blockade while their sisters were back in port taking on coal.
The objective of a blockade is to deny the enemy access to resources delivered by sea. Geography dictated that Germany's Atlantic shipping had to proceed via the English Channel or the North Sea. Hence, the Admiralty adopted a "distant blockade" strategy. A British Battle Squadron of heavy pre-dreadnought ships supported by large numbers of destroyers, torpedo boats, and minefields protected the Channel, whereas the powerful Grand Fleet withdrew to the northern ports of Rosyth, Edinburgh, Cromarty, and Scapa Flow, where it could easily check German attempts to break out of the North Sea.
Britain's "distant blockade" proved successful. By 1916, Germany had been blockaded for two years. Food shortages had begun to impact the performance of the German military as well as damage civilian morale on the home front. The only effective German naval weapon was the U-boat, but Germany suspended submarine warfare in May of 1916 to keep America from entering the war.
German naval strategists were frustrated. Ever since war erupted in 1914, they had crafted plans to lure a portion of the Royal Navy into a decisive battle in German territorial waters, where a combination of underwater mines and submarine attacks would reduce the British fleet to a level of relative parity with the smaller German High Seas Fleet, which would then prevail by virtue of superior German naval engineering and seamanship.
Notwithstanding these hopes, the German admirals knew the High Seas Fleet could not challenge the Grand Fleet in open one-on-one battle. In fact, the British Admiralty had consistently attempted to draw the smaller German Navy into such a large-scale confrontation. Admiral Hugo von Pohl, commander of the German High Seas Fleet, prudently resisted this temptation, aided by the Kaiser, but in February 1916, he was replaced by Admiral Reinhardt von Scheer, a far more aggressive strategist.
Scheer reasoned the High Seas Fleet could break the Royal Navy's dominance without losing too many ships. He settled on a plan to lure a small portion of the Grand Fleet - Beatty's forces stationed in Rosyth -- into a trap and destroy it, thereby reducing Germany's numerical disadvantage.
On May 30, Scheer ordered Admiral Franz von Hipper to take forty ships on a sweep along the Danish coast. Scheer himself followed with the bulk of the High Seas Fleet, the shark lurking behind Hipper's bait. The plan assumed credulity on the part of the British, and very likely had a small chance of success even if the British Admiralty had not been reading German Navy's wireless transmissions since 1914. The signals to the High Seas Fleet were intercepted, and the Royal Navy ordered into action. Scheer had no idea that virtually the full strength of the Grand Fleet was at sea by the time Hipper's force steamed out of its ports. Notwithstanding this triumph of British intelligence, confused communications between the Admiralty and Admiral Jellicoe led the British to believe Scheer's ships had remained in port. Thus, neither side knew the other's entire fleet had gone to sea.
The stage was set.
In 1916, reconnaissance aircraft were quite rare and limited in their capabilities. Both Jellicoe and Scheer relied on scouting cruisers to locate the enemy. The two sets of scouting cruisers under the command of Beatty and Hipper made initial contact at 2:00pm, and after a brief gunfire exchange, returned to guide their fleets to battle.
Beatty, a popular and aggressive leader in the Royal Navy who could sometimes be given to recklessness, commanded the fifty-two ships of the 1st Battlecruiser Squadron, 2nd Battlecruiser Squadron, and 5th Battle Squadron, together with the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons and 1st, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas, all out of the Scottish port of Rosyth.
At 3:45pm, Beatty made contact with Hipper and his forty ships, and their battlecruiser duel began. At this time Hipper was heading south, trying to lead Beatty toward Scheer's approaching fleet. The two battlegroups opened fire at a range of fifteen kilometers. Within a few minutes, rolling clouds of coal smoke and cordite fumes hampered visibility. This condition created problems for both sides, but the sun's western position silhouetted the British ships against the horizon and thus provided a significant advantage for the German gunners.
At 4:05pm, Jellicoe dispatched the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron ahead under Admiral Hood to assist Beatty.
Meanwhile, back at the ongoing battle, Beatty's group was in trouble. After receiving five hits from the guns of German battlecruiser Von Der Tann, the British battlecruiser Indefatigable sank at 4:03pm following a catastrophic magazine explosion. Over a thousand sailors died in the blast. At 4:25pm, Queen Mary took two salvoes and exploded, vanishing beneath the water within two minutes. Each side also lost two destroyers during this engagement.
Upon witnessing the destruction of Queen Mary, Beatty is said to have commented, "There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today." However, despite the swift loss of two major ships, Beatty altered course to engage the German ships more closely. With the arrival of the battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron and magnificent British gunnery, the tables turned and Hipper faced potential disaster.
It is important to note that Beatty's force had the use of 12-, 13-, and even 15-inch guns, whereas Hipper's group carried smaller caliber 11- and 12-inch guns. This difference meant Hipper's ships had to get comparatively close to Beatty's before opening fire.
The tables turned again with the arrival of Scheer at 4:30pm. Beatty's position became much more difficult. At that time, Jellicoe and the rest of the Grand Fleet were still twenty kilometers northwest of Beatty. As Beatty had believed Scheer's ships still in port, the sighting of Scheer's vanguard by HMS Southhampton doubtless came as an unpleasant surprise. Hipper's task of luring Beatty into Scheer's arms had succeeded in the nick of time. Unfortunately for the German plan, Southhampton had ventured far enough south of the battle to give Beatty sufficient warning to escape the trap.
At 4:40pm, Beatty ordered his force to reverse course, hoping to tempt the High Seas Fleet to follow him into the guns of the Grand Fleet. The British battlecruisers made their turn without difficulty, but confused signaling on the bridge of the severely damaged H.M.S. Lion left the battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron to their own devices. By the time their commander, Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, realized the rest of Beatty's force was steaming in the opposite direction, his ships were nearly within range of Scheer's guns.
At 4:57pm, Barham began her turn, having been delayed by signal errors, the rest of the 5th Battle Squadron followed in succession. For the next fifteen minutes the 5th Battle Squadron battled the entire High Seas Fleet, with Barham and Valiant firing at Hipper and Warspite and Malaya firing at Scheer. Konig, Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf, Seydlitz, Lutzow, and Derfflinger were hit in this exchange.
Once out of sight of Hipper, Beatty turned NNE and caught Hipper between his battlecruiser groups and the 5th Battle Squadron. SMS Lutzow, SMS Seydlitz and SMS Derfflinger were hit again, and Hipper turned away. Scheer followed, hoping to bring his big guns into range against Beatty.
Jellicoe's battlecruiser squadrons headed quickly towards Beatty's fleet, but hesitated to commit them for want of knowing the bearing of the oncoming German fleet. This information was vital, as faulty deployment could lead to disaster. Not until almost 6:15pm did word reach Jellicoe regarding the position and bearing of Scheer's ships, just as the first of Beatty's ships raced across the line of Jellicoe's advance in a trail of black smoke and distant gunflashes.
To an appalled Scheer, the sight of the Grand Fleet's long line looming from the smoke and haze amid the flash and thunder of heavy guns must have been a moment of utter nightmare. The Grand Fleet opened fire as soon as it came into range. Recognizing his dangerous position, Scheer ordered all his ships to make a simultaneous "about turn." Fortunately, though this was a difficult maneuver, the High Seas Fleet had practiced it to perfection and executed it now behind a smoke screen laid down by German destroyers.
While the trap was being sprung on Scheer, German guns achieved some spectacular successes, putting HMS Warspite, and Warrior out of action and blowing up Defence. Warrior later sunk on her way back to port. HMS Invincible also fell victim to a magazine explosion after a German shell penetrated a turret at 6:33pm. The death of the Invincible took the lives of over 700 men, including Rear Admiral Hood.
However, this triumph came with a price. British guns had fatally crippled Lutzow, and badly damaged the other German battlecruisers, with only their superior compartmentalization saving them from a similar fate. Scheer now found himself desperately on the defensive, still not fully cognizant he faced the entire Grand Fleet. He reversed course once again in hopes of breaking through the enemy lines to gain a clear escape route to his own minefields. Once again he encountered a line of dreadnoughts and had to retire or face annihilation.
At this time, a massed torpedo attack by German destroyers saved the High Seas Fleet from disaster. Though the effect of this torpedo salvo was negligible, Jellicoe turned his own battle line away, believing it the only sufficiently effective alternative to massed torpedo attack under the prevailing circumstances. By the time the Grand Fleet turned again to regain contact, Scheer's group had widened the distance between the fleets to fifteen miles. There was still time to catch the German ships if Jellicoe ordered a fast interception.
However, Jellicoe did not do so, fearing Scheer was trying to lead the Grand Fleet into a submarine trap or minefield. Instead, Jellicoe headed south, intending to put his ships between Scheer and the safety of German ports. At 1910 the two fleets made contact again. Scheer ordered Hipper's battleships to charge the Grand Fleet, while ordering his own ships to turn away from the fighting. After some twenty minutes of firing, Hipper also headed home.
Again, unwilling to follow the same route as the German ships, Jellicoe headed south-west and managed to intercept Hipper at 2015. During the ensuing engagement, Lutzow was sunk and Seydlitz and Derfflinger suffered severe damage before the British once again chose not to follow the retreating German fleet. Though these decisions later proved controversial, Jellicoe did not trust the uncertain fortunes of a night action. Ultimately, Scheer and Hipper managed to slip through the British lines and reach the safety of their minefields at approximately 3:00am on June 1. For Scheer, his arrival in the haven of German waters must have felt like a miracle. Had the Grand Fleet caught the High Seas Fleet again during the day, German prospects for survival were bleak.
Then the post-battle public relations battle began. Scheer and the Kaiserliche Marine immediately claimed victory based on the number of ships destroyed. Whereas the Royal Navy had lost three battlecruisers, three cruisers, and eight destroyers with a total of 6,100 casualties, the High Seas Fleet had lost only one battleship, four light cruisers, and three destroyers with an accompanying total of 2,550 casualties. In fact, however, the casualty counts failed to note the mauled condition of many surviving German vessels. They would spend a great deal of time undergoing repairs before they would be ready to take to sea again.
In the face of sharp domestic criticism for his decision not to pursue the High Seas Fleet more aggressively, Jellicoe argued his first priority was to protect the size of the Grand Fleet. His strategy was vindicated by the virtual absence of the High Seas Fleet for the remainder of the war. Whereas Jellicoe telegraphed the British government on June 2, 1916 that the Grand Fleet was ready for duty and could sail on four hours' notice, the German High Seas Fleet was no longer fit for battle. More importantly, it had suffered such a terrible beating that its leaders never dared risk another major confrontation with the Royal Navy, even after the damaged ships had been repaired.
What was the significance of Jutland?
First, as mentioned above, the High Seas Fleet thereafter remained idle and failed to play a significant role in the war other than its mere presence requiring Britain's continued maintenance of the Grand Fleet. In order to achieve a strategic naval victory, Germany had to destroy a sufficiently large number of British ships to offset Britain's enormous numerical superiority. Instead, Britain merely shrugged off its Jutland losses while the German fleet limped back into port for months of repairs. Though the Germans could be said to have achieved a tactical victory, it was a Pyrrhic one more accurately described as a strategic defeat. The leaders of the German Navy were convinced another major operation against the Grand Fleet would result in the destruction of the High Seas Fleet. In 1918, the German Navy's refusal to follow an order to sail against England sparked the deposition of the Kaiser and the end of the war.
Second, for the rest of the war, Germany relied on U-boats to carry the burden of sea warfare, straining to cut off British trade and cause Britain's economic collapse. Ultimately, however, this strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare brought the United States into the war and sealed Germany's fate.
Finally, Jutland spelled the end of battlecruiser doctrine as an element of naval strategy. Battlecruisers had been thought an optimal marriage of speed and heavy firepower at a cost of protection. However, with battleship-sized vessels, the surrender of armor for greater speed left ships excessively vulnerable, and the great number of battlecruiser fatalities at Jutland underlined this flawed thinking.
The primary fault in the design of the battlecruiser was the lack of deck armor for protection against plunging gunfire. Obviously, as the ranges increased, so did the arc of the projectiles. Battlecruisers were designed to operate against targets at high speeds and relatively close ranges where their side armor would offer protection. Ironically, it would be this same design flaw that would result in the tragic loss of the HMS Hood in 1941, and the 'white elephant' status of the USS Alaska Class battlecruisers in WW2.